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A Comparative Perspective  
on Reforming the 
New Zealand Bill  
of Rights Act
Stephen Gardbaum 
As an academic comparative constitutional lawyer, I come 
to the recent Constitutional Advisory Panel report and the 
issue of whether and how the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 (NZBORA) should be reformed from a particular 
– perhaps idiosyncratic – perspective. This is viewing the 
NZBORA as an influential version of a new general model of 
constitutionalism. This model grants to legislatures ultimate 
responsibility for the resolution of controversial rights 
issues while at the same time seeking to improve the rights 
sensitivity of the legislative process and increasing the rights 
protective powers of courts as compared with the traditional 
institutional form of parliamentary supremacy. At least in 
theory and aspiration, this general model provides an 
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alternative to both the latter, venerable 
form of constitutional arrangement 
and its conventional rival, the model 
of constitutional supremacy, involving 
a fully constitutionalised regime of 
supreme, entrenched law enforced by the 
power of one or more courts to invalidate 
inconsistent statutes. As an experiment, 
this new model seeks to create greater 
balance between courts and legislatures 
on the resolution of contested rights 
issues than the traditional alternatives, 
whilst also providing an effective regime 
of rights protection. 
As a result of this particular perspective 
on the issue, of the many topics raised in 
the constitutional advisory report, my 
focus in this article will be on institutional, 
and particularly inter-institutional, 
relations and allocations of power under 
the NZBORA, rather than on the content 
of its rights provisions. In other words, I 
shall be concentrating on structural rights 
issues and not substantive ones. And 
within this subset of NZBORA issues, I 
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shall mostly be focusing specifically on two: 
(1) improving the legislative role, and (2) 
the appropriate scope of judicial power. In 
so doing, my aim is to bring comparative 
experience to bear on the discussion.
I think it is worth stating at the outset 
that from this vantage point, of the five 
jurisdictions to have adopted versions 
of this ‘new Commonwealth model of 
constitutionalism’ (Gardbaum, 2013), 
New Zealand is in my overall view 
performing the best, in that it is hewing 
most closely to the ‘intermediate’ aims 
and design structure of the model. At a 
very general level, courts are exercising 
the new rights-protecting powers granted 
by the NZBORA, as distinct from either 
not using or misusing (i.e., over-using) 
them, but rights issues are still frequently 
resolved by Parliament. This contrasts 
most clearly, in my view, with the 
situations in Canada, where in practice 
the latter is no longer true given the 
strong reluctance to employ the section 
33 legislative override mechanism, 
and the two sub-national Australian 
jurisdictions of ACT and Victoria, where 
the courts are mostly failing to use their 
new powers (Debaljak, 2011). Under 
its Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), the 
United Kingdom I think is a closer call 
and comes second to New Zealand in 
terms of practice living up to theory, in 
that, while not lurching as closely towards 
the judicial supremacy pole as Canada, 
the preferred and intended legislative–
judicial balance on rights issues is more 
off-kilter, due significantly to the skewing 
impact on the working of the model of 
the European Convention on Human 
Rights. That all said, the NZBORA is 
certainly not functioning in anything like 
an ‘ideal’ fashion, and in the third section 
of this article I explain the problems in 
its operation as I see them, and suggest 
some possible reforms to each of its – 
and the general model’s – three distinct 
stages. But it is perhaps useful to state 
this broader, ‘macro’ evaluation at the 
outset to help place this discussion in 
proper perspective.
Before setting out on this task, 
however, let me briefly state my view on 
an even more macro question, what Sir 
Geoffrey Palmer has recently referred 
to as ‘the big issue’ concerning the 
NZBORA (Palmer, 2013), as distinct 
from the ‘tweaking’ that I will mostly 
focus on. This, of course, is whether the 
NZBORA should be constitutionalised 
– made supreme law and enforced 
through a judicial power to strike down 
inconsistent statutes. Personally, I find the 
new Commonwealth model normatively 
attractive relative to the other two 
leading alternatives. If I had to choose 
between these other two, either generally 
or specifically in the New Zealand 
context, I might opt for constitutional 
supremacy, given what seem to me to be 
valid contemporary concerns about the 
concentration of power in parliamentary 
executives and the consequent 
undermining of political accountability 
and responsibility to legislatures that is 
the major continuous check within the 
theory and practice of parliamentary 
sovereignty (Gardbaum, 2014). But I 
believe comparative experience within 
established democracies more generally 
suggests that, even though courts can 
usefully be employed as an instrument 
of dispersal, some lesser judicial power 
is preferable because of the new risk of 
courts coming to monopolise authority 
themselves over rights issues. For this 
reason, ‘tweaking’ the current system 
seems to me the better path of reform. 
Moreover,	as	the	Constitutional	Advisory	
Panel report states, there appears to be no 
more significant support now for giving 
the NZBORA supreme law status than 
there	was	in	1986.
There is also some separate discussion 
in the report on the issue of entrenching 
the NZBORA in whole or part by means 
of some special amendment procedure, 
such as a required three-quarter majority 
vote in Parliament or an ordinary 
majority in a referendum.1 To the extent 
that this is intended as a distinct issue 
from the potential supreme law status of 
the NZBORA – i.e. that the entrenched 
provisions would still have only the 
force of ordinary law in the event of a 
conflict with another statute and section 
4 would still apply – I am not sure it 
addresses a real concern. Unlike the HRA 
and the Victorian Charter in particular, 
the NZBORA does not appear to be 
politically endangered, as it currently has 
the support of both major parties. Unless 
inserted at the same time as any such 
entrenchment provision, this latter would 
of course be a two-way ratchet, making 
the addition of new rights – such as those 
discussed in the report – as difficult as 
repealing current ones.
some comparative perspective
Common to the model in all five 
jurisdictions are three constitutive steps. 
The first is political rights review during the 
legislative process, which is designed as an 
ex ante mechanism to improve its outputs 
from a rights perspective by inculcating 
rights	 sensitivity	 among	 ministers,	 MPs	
and officials, focusing attention on the 
rights implications of bills and promoting 
rights deliberation at all stages of their 
passage into law. Secondly there is a form of 
ex post constitutional review by the courts, 
empowering them to engage in rights-
friendly statutory interpretation and to 
assess the compatibility of legislation with 
protected rights, whether or not they have 
the power of invalidation. The third step 
is political review and reconsideration 
of a law in light of the prior exercise of 
judicial review, and a legislative power 
of final resolution of the rights issue, 
typically (though perhaps not necessarily) 
by ordinary majority vote.
Overall, certain general problems 
have arisen in practice among the 
various jurisdictions in all three areas. 
Unlike the HRA and the Victorian Charter in 
particular, the NZBORA does not appear to be 
politically endangered, as it currently has the 
support of both major parties.
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Summarizing very briefly, the main 
problem at the first stage has been 
the quite limited role of specifically 
legislative deliberation, as distinct from 
the substantial impact that the required 
rights vetting has had on the formalised 
processes of developing, proposing and 
drafting government bills by the executive. 
This gap has primarily been due to the 
Westminster system of executive/party 
dominance, and obviously requires 
creative institutional reforms to address 
it. An only slightly lesser problem, at least 
to my mind, has been that too much of 
the rights scrutiny by both executives and 
legislatures has been exclusively legal in 
nature, rather than taking broader moral 
and political values into account. 
Although reasonable people will and 
do differ on this, to my mind the major 
reason for rejecting judicial supremacy 
in the first place is the nature of many 
controversial rights issues, which, 
whether or not enshrined in a bill of 
rights, are not exclusively legal in content 
but necessarily implicate more general 
moral and political values, on which 
the judiciary has no special authority or 
expertise. This is particularly so where, as 
if often the case, vague, underdetermined 
or underspecified rights provisions are 
also subject to the modern proportionality 
principle. Simply labelling these legal 
issues does not make them so. It artificially 
narrows the type of reasoning employed, 
or licenses courts to roam beyond their 
subject-matter jurisdiction; either way, it 
overly empowers lawyers and judges at 
the expense of citizens and their elected 
representatives. Under the new model, the 
legislative role is designed in significant 
part to inject these broader values into 
rights deliberation. If simply having an 
available ex ante mechanism of rights 
review were the only reason for the first 
stage, continental-style abstract judicial 
review of legislation could be borrowed, 
perhaps through more routine advisory 
opinion jurisdiction. 
As far as the second stage of judicial 
review is concerned, with the exception 
of the two Australian jurisdictions, I 
believe that, broadly speaking, courts 
have for the most part exercised their new 
powers in appropriate and expected ways, 
notwithstanding a few concerns at the 
more detailed or micro level. With respect 
to the NZBORA, I shall be discussing 
these in the next section. In the UK, after 
a few early teething problems involving an 
overly robust understanding of the scope 
of the interpretative duty under section 3, 
the courts appear to have reached more 
of an equilibrium between section 3 and 
their declaratory power under section 
4, employing them on a roughly similar 
number of occasions. Here I am putting 
to one side more substantive criticisms 
concerning the outcomes of particular 
cases or classes of cases as being either 
insufficiently or overly rights protective, 
and also about the courts’ application 
of section 2 directing them ‘to take into 
account’ decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights. In Canada courts have 
generally done what courts do when they 
have the power to invalidate legislation: 
they have employed it quite forcefully and 
regularly, albeit that the judicially-created 
proportionality doctrine and remedy 
of suspended declarations of invalidity 
sometimes allow legislatures a slightly 
longer leash.
Finally, on political reconsideration 
following judicial review, certainly a key 
issue, thus far the record has not been 
particularly encouraging. In Canada, 
the temporary but renewable legislative 
override power under section 33 remains 
essentially dormant, leaving the courts’ 
decision whether or not to uphold 
‘legislative sequels’ under proportionality 
analysis the major claimed source of 
judicial–legislative ‘dialogue’. In Australia 
there has only been one final declaration 
of inconsistency in either jurisdiction, 
whereas in the UK 18 out of 19 final 
declarations triggered amendment or 
repeal of the statute, with the vexed issue 
of prisoners’ voting rights the outstanding 
and still unresolved one. Stated baldly, I 
think this figure is slightly misleading, in 
that several of the declarations involved 
statutes that (1) had either been, or were 
in the process of being, amended at the 
time, or (2) had already been adjudged 
by the European Court of Human Rights 
to violate the convention, so creating an 
international legal obligation to change 
them. And with respect to a few others 
there has been some disagreement as to 
whether the amendment fully resolved 
the declared incompatibility. In New 
Zealand, again to be discussed in a little 
more detail below, in almost every case 
the political branchs has responded to 
judicial decisions on rights in one way 
or another, with an overall mixed record 
of accepting and not accepting these 
decisions. Notable among the latter 
is the Hansen v R decision applying 
section 4 of the NZBORA to the reverse 
onus of proof attaching to possession of 
specified	 quantities	 under	 the	Misuse	 of	
Drugs Act 1975.2 In neither the UK nor 
New Zealand instances of not acting 
on the judicial view did the quantity or 
quality of legislative rights deliberation 
come close to satisfying the normative 
standards that in my view are necessary 
for the justification of this power.
 The nZBoRA
Let me now turn specifically to the 
NZBORA and address some of the issues 
flagged in the Constitutional Advisory 
Panel’s report. Once again my suggested 
reforms will all fall into Geoffrey Palmer’s 
‘tweaking’ category, so I obviously do not 
share his ‘either make it supreme law or 
don’t tinker’ view, although I certainly 
respect it. 
At the first, rights-vetting, stage 
the key weakness has been the role 
of the legislature, as Tessa Bromwich 
and Andrew Geddis have convincingly 
shown (Bromwich, 2009; Geddis, 2009). 
Accordingly, the focus should be on how 
In New Zealand ... in almost every case the political 
branch has responded to judicial decisions on rights 
in one way or another, with an overall mixed record 
of accepting and not accepting  ... decisions.
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to improve legislative consideration of, 
and deliberation on, rights issues raised 
by proposed bills. To the significant 
extent that the underlying problem here 
is executive and party dominance in a 
Westminster-style system, any general 
measures to weaken this hold over the 
legislative process – including, perhaps, 
abolishing the ‘party vote’ in Parliament 
– are to be welcomed. But apart from 
such general or systemic reforms, what 
might be helpful in this regard with 
respect to NZBORA’s specific processes 
and requirements?
One idea is to require section 7 
reports for every bill introduced into 
Parliament, rather than only those 
the attorney-general believes to be 
inconsistent with the NZBORA, as is the 
case in the UK, ACT and Victoria. That 
is, the rights implications of a bill should 
be reported whether or not it is deemed 
compatible. It is true that on occasion 
the attorney-general has elected to issue 
a ‘not a section 7 report’, and that the 
government usually makes available the 
advice provided to the attorney-general 
on all bills. Nonetheless, I believe that for 
Parliament and the relevant parliamentary 
committee to receive focused and 
politically accountable information on 
how the executive has identified and 
assessed the rights implications in the 
case of every government bill would 
be helpful in more deeply inculcating a 
norm of a rights-conscious legislative 
process. For one thing, it may reduce the 
reflex sense that any report produced is 
the occasion for partisan solidarity for or 
against the bill. In addition, to the extent 
that section 7 reports now (or any newly 
required ‘not a section 7 report’ would) 
sometimes provide rather conclusory 
assessments that do not afford a real basis 
for understanding how they were made, 
the Australian practice of requiring 
reasoned statements for compatibility 
and incompatibility reports – whether 
and how they are consistent – could 
usefully be adopted.
I also believe that from a systemic 
or	 functional	 perspective,	 62	 section	 7	
reports since 1990, especially given the 
increased pace at which they have been 
issued in recent years, is too high. Not, 
I should immediately stress, because any 
were not merited on an individual basis 
or did not reflect the sincere fulfilment of 
the statutory duty by the attorney-general 
under the current standard, but because 
from a more functional standpoint the 
overall impact of such relatively frequent 
reports threatens to routinise what ought 
to be a relative rarity: risks reducing the 
political significance or gravity of each 
one. Just as in legal systems in which each 
decision of an apex court is designed to be 
individually considered and digested for its 
potentially system-wide significance, the 
number of such decisions is deliberately 
kept low by means of fully discretionary 
jurisdiction, something similar is at work 
here. The high number also arguably 
sends a message that the cabinet does 
not take the NZBORA very seriously. So, 
although I am certainly not commending 
the opposite flaw as exhibited in Canada 
and the UK, where the numbers of 
incompatibility statements are zero and 
two respectively, the criteria or standard 
for triggering a section 7 report should 
be adjusted to try and ensure that such a 
finding is a more special event, attracting 
the type of attention that raises the 
costs of politics-as-usual. To the extent 
that section 7 reports take into account 
justified limits less than elsewhere, 
changing this practice might be another 
way to reduce the number. 
On this score, but also relating to my 
earlier critique of pre-enactment rights-
vetting as exclusively a legal issue, I 
think it is worth considering transferring 
responsibility for making reports from 
the attorney-general to the sponsoring 
minister, as again in the UK and Australia. 
The idea here is partly to help promote 
greater rights-consciousness among a 
larger group of government ministers and 
officials, and partly to spread the burden 
if a report is required for every bill. But 
it is mostly to overcome or reduce any 
perception that the NZBORA raises 
purely legal and technical issues that are 
separate and distinct from the normal and 
more central public policy concerns of 
politicians, to be handled and overcome 
by a specialist group of expert officials. 
In order to transcend any such perceived 
division of labour and to promote the 
injection of broader moral and political 
values into rights deliberation that is 
often both an inherent part of their 
resolution and a more appropriate task of 
the political branches than the courts, the 
final executive branch judgment at the 
time a bill is introduced should be made 
and presented by the responsible minister, 
albeit one who is fully informed by the 
prior legal advice of officials, including 
perhaps the attorney-general.
Once a bill is introduced into Parlia-
ment, comparative experience suggests 
that the best type of committee to engage 
in serious and detailed rights scrutiny is 
one that specialises in the subject, along 
the lines of the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights in the UK (and also now 
at the federal level in Australia). The Joint 
Committee on Human Rights has three 
characteristics in particular that enable 
it to function reasonably effectively in 
a difficult context in which even this 
level of success is at a premium: (1) as 
a specialised committee with a license 
to consider the rights implications of 
any bill, its members develop expertise 
which gives them additional credibility 
with their parliamentary colleagues and 
executive officials alike; (2) it has its own 
top-notch human rights lawyer to advise 
and provide legal opinions;3 and (3) 
as a joint committee of both houses of 
Parliament, it has no in-built government 
majority and has been able to operate on 
a broadly non-partisan basis. 
In thinking about switching from 
the current system under the NZBORA, 
Once a bill introduced into Parliament, comparative 
experience suggests that the best type of committee 
to engage in serious and detailed rights scrutiny is 
one that specialises in the subject ...
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in which legislative rights scrutiny is 
undertaken by the ordinary subject-
matter select committees, three practical 
problems of varying degrees of difficulty 
immediately present themselves. The 
first is possible resentment and hostility 
towards a specialist committee on the 
part of the existing select committees, 
which would continue to scrutinise 
the non-rights dimensions of bills 
– especially if its reports are treated 
differently or any exceptions are made to 
normal procedures for their discussion. 
I think the appropriate response is that 
any ‘special’ treatment of rights issues 
should be understood to reflect and 
express the ‘constitutional status’ of 
the NZBORA. Second is the problem 
of staffing such a specialist committee, 
given the small absolute (though clearly 
not	 per	 capita)	 number	 of	 MPs.	 This	
legitimate concern provides one reason 
to resist calls for reducing the size of 
Parliament towards more typical average 
international representation levels. The 
hardest problem is how to reproduce the 
relative independence and non-partisan 
nature of the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights in a unicameral legislature. I am 
not sure what the solution to this is short 
of the political non-starter of reviving 
the Legislative Council and electing 
its members on a different basis from 
the House. But even the most party-
controlled of legislatures usually have a 
small corps of members who press and 
take a particular interest in rights issues, 
and these should be drafted first. 
Finally, in thinking about the 
importance of the committee stage to 
legislative rights review, the practice 
of enacting bills under urgency seems 
inconsistent with the constitutional 
status of the NZBORA and the fact that, 
section 4 notwithstanding, it expressly 
applies to Parliament.4 This is especially 
so where the executive vetting stage has 
identified a bill as raising serious rights 
issues, and certainly where one is deemed 
inconsistent by the attorney-general.5 
 The overall sense here is that with 
fewer, less ‘technical’ section 7 reports and 
more rights concerns and amendments 
emanating from a specialised committee 
with the expertise, time and resources 
to invest in the task, the relevance of 
the NZBORA to the legislative process 
and the amount of parliamentary rights 
deliberation will increase. This is essential 
because, as Andrew Geddis has suggested 
(Geddis, 2011), in this day and age no 
longer can any Parliament anywhere take 
for granted the right to the final say; it 
must earn it.
Turning to the role of courts under 
the NZBORA, the key problem in my 
view is that cases in which judges find an 
inconsistency and apply section 4 do not 
receive sufficient attention in the media 
and elsewhere to ensure that Parliament 
comes under political pressure to address 
and resolve the rights issue. Such publicity 
and attendant raising of political costs 
is an important structural feature of an 
institutional arrangement in which the 
default rule lies with parliament and its 
affirmative action is needed to affect the 
continuing operation of the law, as in all 
versions except the Canadian one; it is 
part of the model’s subtle combination 
of legal and political mechanisms. Again, 
Hansen v R is the best example here, and 
it is instructive to compare the reception 
of this decision with that of the House 
of Lords’ declaration of incompatibility 
in A and Others.6 In the latter, the UK 
government’s very first, reflex response 
was to do nothing, but this quickly became 
politically impossible due to the media 
and political reaction (Sathanapally, 
2012, pp.191-2). Accordingly, as Claudia 
Geiringer has argued (Geiringer, 2009), 
New Zealand courts need to not just find 
an incompatibility where a statute cannot 
be interpreted in a rights-consistent 
manner, as section 4 implicitly requires 
(Rishworth, 2004), but to declare it. 
Otherwise, as in Hansen, the finding risks 
being buried beneath the judgment that 
the claimant loses.
It would be fine in my view, and 
arguably preferable, for courts to imply 
the declaratory power as long as this 
mode of establishment does not hamper 
its full-fledged use, as seems to have 
been the case following Moonen.7 But if 
either the implication or the exercise of 
the power continue to be muted at best 
because of any sense of illegitimacy or 
judicial reluctance to criticise Parliament, 
then the NZBORA should be amended 
to grant it expressly. If this happens, 
consideration might even be given to 
mandating issuance of declarations, rather 
than the current discretionary power in 
the UK and Australia, thereby bringing it 
into line with the interpretative duty (not 
power) placed on courts in the various 
jurisdictions.
In terms of the options for reform 
mentioned in the Constitutional Advisory 
Panel report, this I think is a better choice 
than a judicial invalidation power either 
with or without a legislative override 
provision. I have explained above why I 
think full constitutionalisation is generally 
not justified in the modern rights context. 
The addition of a legislative override 
power has not in practice proven to be 
an effective mechanism for resisting 
or avoiding judicial supremacy in the 
major jurisdiction in which it has been 
instituted, Canada. Rather, the burden and 
political costs placed on the legislature by 
a default rule in favour of the judicial 
position have been too high to overcome.8 
To the extent that a declaratory power is 
thought to create too few incentives for 
individual claimants to pursue cases9 or 
to distort judicial analysis, I believe a law 
or norm that governments compensate 
individuals when they elect to amend 
or repeal a law previously declared 
incompatible by the courts, as currently 
in Ireland,10 or that such amendments/
repeals be given retrospective effect, 
provides a practical solution to the 
problem (Gardbaum, 2013, pp.198-201). 
Another, separately or in tandem, is to 
encourage litigation by public interest 
... the burden and political costs placed on the 
legislature by a default rule in favour of the judicial 
position have been too high to overcome
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groups, for whom any such disincentive 
effects will likely be smaller. I have no real 
issues with how New Zealand courts are 
interpreting	 and	 applying	 section	 6,	 as	 I	
think that ‘reasonably possible meanings’ 
is a reasonable contextual interpretation 
of ‘wherever an enactment can be given a 
meaning that is consistent with the rights’. 
As just discussed, the problem is rather 
with the findings of incompatibility 
that are rendered more likely by this 
interpretation than by a stronger one.
At the final stage of political responses 
to judicial rights decisions, the main 
problem has been less unwillingness to 
disagree with the courts – or to act on 
that disagreement – than with the quality 
of rights engagement in so doing; that is, 
the concern is with process more than 
outcome. This contrasts with the situation 
in Canada, and at least according to 
some also in the UK, where courts have 
in practice mostly been given the final 
word on rights issues. In New Zealand, 
Parliament still decides most significant 
and contested issues and, equally 
importantly, the courts still believe that it 
should.
Overall, the political institutions have 
responded in one way or another to most 
of the important judicial rights decisions, 
with a mixed record of accepting or 
rejecting them. These include Baigent’s 
Case (reference to the Law Commission 
and no action on public law damages), 
Quilter (eventual passage of the Civil 
Unions Act 2004), Taunoa (modifying 
the judicial decision in enacting the 
Victims’ Compensation Act 2005), 
Poumako (resulting in amendment of the 
Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1999 
by the Sentencing Act 2002), Hansen 
(reference to the Law Commission but no 
amendment or repeal of the reverse onus 
provision found incompatible with the 
NZBORA) and Ye (amending the statute 
to	overrule	the	court’s	section	6-inspired	
interpretation of the Immigration Act 
1987). So far so good, as it is fine under 
the NZBORA – and the general model 
– for the political branches to disagree 
with judicial rights resolutions and insist 
on their own. The problem is that, as with 
pre-enactment review, such insistence 
ought to be the product of serious rights 
deliberation rather than raw political 
power, and it has mostly not been. 
Several of the other already suggested 
reforms are geared towards changing the 
equation at this juncture, perhaps most 
directly the judicial declaratory power. 
Another advantage of a specialised rights 
committee such as the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights, as compared with 
ordinary subject-matter select committees, 
is that it has the authority and expertise 
to follow up on findings of inconsistency 
and put pressure on the government for 
a response. To this end, a further reform 
of the NZBORA might bolster the others 
by requiring the responsible minister or 
the attorney-general to respond formally 
to a declaration (or even a finding) of 
inconsistency within six months or some 
other specified period of time, as with the 
Australian bills and declarations by the 
Human Rights Review Tribunal under 
New Zealand’s Human Rights Act 1993.
conclusion
Under the NZBORA, as with the general 
model it instantiates, it is important not 
only that rights are taken seriously, but 
who takes them seriously. Because it has a 
tendency to focus only on the former, full 
constitutionalisation should be resisted 
until such time, if any, as suitable means 
for promoting both halves of the goal 
have been given sufficient opportunity to 
succeed and found to fail. 
The general model is a notable 
constitutional experiment – in whether 
both greater balance between courts and 
legislatures and effective rights protection 
is possible, in whether judicial power can 
be increased without leading inexorably 
to judicial supremacy; in short, whether 
a stable middle ground exists and can 
be maintained. As with all experiments, 
the process of trial and error, of making 
adjustments in the light of experience, is 
an entirely sensible and appropriate one 
to employ before coming to any definitive 
conclusions. It is for this reason that I 
believe tinkering is currently the best 
course of action, not the worst.
1 The report also suggests that this entrenching provision could 
also itself be entrenched (‘double entrenchment’).
2 Hansen v R	[2007]	NZSC	7,	[2007]	3	NZLR	1.	
3  Initially David Feldman and now, for several years, Murray 
Hunt.
4 NZBORA, section 3(a). 
5	 See,	for	example,	C.	Geiringer,	‘Urgency,	Parliament	and	
the Bill of Rights – time for a cup of tea, guys?’, blog 
post at http://55lambtonquay.blogspot.co.nz/2009/04/
urgency-parliament-and-bill-of-rights.html, April 2009, and 
A. Geddis, ‘I think National just broke our constitution’, at 
http://pundit.co.nz, 17 May 2013.
6	 [2004]	UKHL	56	(‘the	Belmarsh	case’).	
7 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 
NZLR	9	(CA)
8	 From	a	pragmatic	perspective,	Canada	presents	the	only	
empirical evidence we have of a constitutionalised system 
combined with a legislative override power, so that unless 
the	near-dormancy	of	section	33	is	due	to	Canada-specific	
reasons, its experience ought to remain a cautionary tale. 
9 As powerfully argued by Tom Hickman in his contribution to 
this issue of Policy Quarterly.
10	Under	section	5(4)(c)	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	
Rights Act 2003. 
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